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STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction of theft in the Third
Judicial District Court.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
In a jury trial before the Honorable Peter F. Leary,
Third District Court, Appellant was convicted of the charge
of theft.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant prays that the conviction entered in the
Third District Court be reversed, that this matter be remanded to the Third District Court for new trial.
FACTS
Appellant entered into a business arrangement with
Complaintant, David Felger, and several other individuals
where real property was to be bought and sold by a business
entity they created.

In order to facilitate the plans of

the company, financing needed to be acquired.

At the point

in time that these transactions were taking place, money was
not generally available within local lending facilities.
Appellant made arrangements with a local lending institution
to make loans on a project the parties were involved in.
Complaintant David Felger testified that he provided the sum
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of $11, 700.00 to Appellant for the purpose of paying spread
money to attract monies from New York to the local banking
institution in order to allow the loan, being negotiated by
the parties, to be made.

Complaintant charges that Defendant,

instead of using the money for the intended purpose, converted
it for his own use.
Defendant testified that he, in fact, received the
money from Complaintant but that prior to receiving the money
he had advised Complaintant that the money would not be
necessary for spread money and testified that Complaintant
agreed that the money could be used to offset personal expenses of the Appellant in continuing to work for the parties.
Defendant testified that it was intended, at all times, that
David Felger would get his money back when the company received it's loans.
For reasons not related to the conduct of either Complaintant or Appellant, the loan for the project was never
approved and the outside financing was never acquired.

A

portion of the monies received by the Appellant were returned
to the Complaintant.
I.

THE COURT INSTRUCTION THAT "THE LAW PRESUMES THAT A
PERSON INTENDS THE REASONABLE AND ORDINARY CONSEQUENCES OF
HIS OWN ACTS" REVERSED THE BURDEN OF PROOF FROM THE PLAINTIFF
TO THE DEFENDANT AND, ACCORDINGLY, WAS A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS
TO THE DEFENDANT.
In the trial of the above matter, Defendant's receipt
. n.
an d use of t h e money was never a ques t io
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whether the receipt was with felonious intent.

On the issue

of intent, the Court instructed the jury over the objection
of Defendant as follows:
Intent or purpose, being a state of mind,
is not always susceptible of proof by direct and
positive evidence and must ordinarily be inferred
from acts, conduct, statements, and circumstances.
The law presumes that a person intends the reasonable and ordinary consequences of his acts. However, this presumption is a rebuttable presumption
and may be overcome by evidence to the contrary.
Utah law, consistent with Federal due process requirements creates a presumption of innocence and requires that
each dnd every element of any offense be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.

Within the elements of the crime necessary

for proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the culpable mental state
is specifically included.

UCA 76-l-501(2)(b), In re Winship

397 US 358, 25 L Ed 2d 368, 90 S Ct. 1068, (1970) It was then clearly the burden of the State to prove
the culpable mental state of Appellant.

An important part of

this proof was drawn from the Court's presumption, built on
Appellant's receipt and use of the money.l
But this is not to say all inferences are infirm.

The

legislature has provided an inference of knowledge of stolen
property in the face of recent possession and no good explanation, UCA 76-6-402, but in this instance, no reversal of
1.

The presumption used by the Court in the instant case is
not one codified by the legislature and, accordingly. represents no burden the legislature has seen fit to place
upon Defendants. The legislature, rather, under UCA ?61-501, seems comfortable to leave the burden for proving
culpable mental state on the shoulders of the State.
- 3-
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burden is provided as the State must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the Defendant's explanation is not reasonable.
State v. Wood, 268 P.2d 998.
If the presumption is merely a permissive inference which
does not require a finding of the elemental fact upon proof
of the fact, but rather serves as evidence of its existence
and proof, no added burden has been placed upon the Defendant.
Ulster Countv Court v. Allen,
S Ct.

(1979).

~US~-'

60 L Ed 2d 777, 99

In ULSTER, Defendants were convicted of pos-

session of a firearm when they were fotmd riding in the same
automobile with a young lady whose open purse contained two
firearms in plain view.

The Court, in that case, instructed

the jury that is was entitled to infer possession from the
Defendant's presence in the car where the guns were found.
upholding the conviction, the Court stated:
The trial court instructions make it clear
that the presumption was merely a part of the
prosecution's case; that it gave rise to a permissive inference available only in certain
circumstances rather than a mandatory conclusion
of possession and that it could be ignored by
the jury even if there was no affirmative proof
offered by Defendants in rebuttal. Id. US~60 L Ed 2d 777, 794.
Accordingly, in determining whether the instruction given in
the instant case meets constitutional muster, the nature of
the presumption must be determined.

In making this deter-

mination, it is necessary to look at the actual words spoken
and how a reasonable juror could have interpreted the instructions.

Sandstrom v. Montana,

us

, 61 L Ed 2d
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In

39, 99 S Ct.

, (1979).

In SANDSTROM, the Court dealt with

an instruction similar to that given in the instant case but
ending short with:

"The law presumes that a person intends

the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts."
US

61 L Ed 2d 39, 43.

Id.,

In concluding that that instructior.

failed to meet constitutional requirements of due process, the
Court determined that:
"The challenged jury instruction had the
effect of releasing the State of the burden of
proof enunciated in WINSHIP on the critical
question of petitioners state of mind." Id.
US
, 61 L Ed 2d, 39, 49.
T'.:e instant presumption, however, does not go so far,
r~

to be conclusive, but allows the Defendant to overcome and
but the presumption by offering affirmative evidence.

If the

presumption was clearly mandatory, there would be no question
of it's unconstitutionality.

However, where some latitutde

is granted to the jury, the decision of constitutuionality
must rest upon whether the presumption creates merely an infer·
ence, which may be overcome by any amount of evidence presented by the Defendant, or one that shifts the burden to
the Defendant to prove his lack of guilty state of mind.

Id.

And, as established in SANDSTROM, the test is neither the stac
utory intent, with respect to such presumptions, nor the intent of the judge but whether a reasonable juror could have
interpreted this instruction to place a burden upon the
Defendant.
In the instant case, the acts of the Defendant re-

-5-
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sulted in the Complaintant losing possession of at least a
portion of money.

The only real issue litigated in the case

was whether the Complaintant's loss was as a result of Appellant's intent to deprive him of the money.

The consequence

of the acts of the Appellant stands for a presumption of
intent to deprive under the instruction given by the Court.
Following the instruction, the jury would then look to Appellant to rebut and overcome this evidence in order to prove his
innocence.

The ordinary and probability reading of these

words by any juror is not the inference of ULSTER; one that
could be ignored by the jury even if there was no affirmative
proof offered by the Defendant in rebuttal.

The Court's in-

struction does not even tell the jury that the production of any
evidence by the Defendant would overcome the presumption.

This

interpretation was argued by the State of Montana in SANDSTROM
and found by the Court to be not the logical, let alone the
possible interpretation in this case.

In fact, one would wonder

if such an instruction could have any meaning under such an
interpretation when some evidence had, in fact, been advanced,
as in the instant case.
It is far more logical and certainly possible that the
reasonable juror, faced with this instruction, would attempt to
weigh the evidence presented by the defendant to determine if
that evidence is sufficient to overcome the presumption of
guilt established by the ordinary consequences of his act.
-6Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Once the jury, or even one juror looks to the Defendant to
prove his state of mind, based only on his performance of
the acts alleged, the State has been relieved of it's burden
to prove culpable mental state beyond a reasonable doubt.
SANDSTROM does not require a showing that the jury
or a juror actually made this interpretation, only that one
or more reasonably could have made such an interpretation.
There is more than a possibility that one or more jurors
shifted the burden of proof to Appellant, relying on this
instruction.

Accordingly, the instruction was improper and

the matter should be remanded for new trial.
II.

THE COURT ERRORED IN PROVIDING AN INSTRUCTION ON
DEFINITION OF THE TERM "KNOWINGLY" IN CONJUNCTION WITH
INTENT AND PURPOSE.
In the instant case, a part of it's Instruction No. 6
over objection of the Defendant, the Court included the
following:
In a case such as this, under the law,
no person is guilty of an offense unless his
conduct is prohibited by law and he acts intentially or knowingly. A person acts intentionally under the law, either with respect
to the nature of his conduct or to the results
of his conduct, when it is that persons conscious objective or desire to engage in the
conduct or cause the result. A person acts
knowingly when he is aware of the nature of
his conduct or the existing circumstances or
that his conduct is reasonably certain to
cause the result.
Appellant was charged under Utah Code Annotated, 76-6-404
with the crime of theft.

The language of that section re-

-7-
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quires "a purpose to deprive", calling for a specific culpable
mental state known as specific intent.

This standard requires

a conscious purpose, not constructive intent, resulting from
any degree of recklessness or knowledge of possible danger to
the Cornplaintant.
But in it's instruction, the Court required, not a
finding that the Appellant engaged in conduct which deprived
the Complaintant of his property intentionally, but alternately, knowingly.

This, of itself, might not have been so bad

except the instruction of knowingly further establishes culpability if the Appellant's conduct is reasonably certain to
cause the result.

The result, in this case, being the loss

of property to the Complaintant.

In many cases and situations,

this may present no problem, but in the instant case where
the conduct of the Appellant may well be determined by a jury
to have been reckless and in opposition to the best interests
of the Complaintant, logically leading to the deprivation of
his property.

There is a great risk that the requirement for

proof of intent may have been watered down.

Appellant was not

charged with the crime of reckless loss of Complaintant's
money, but may well have been convicted of such a non-crime
based on the instruction complained of herein.
Appellant's conviction should be reversed and the
case remanded for new trial.

-8-
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CONCLUSION
This case having turned on the issue of intent.
and the constitutional standard for proof of that important
element having been placed in grave doubt through the
erroneous allowance of Court Instruction Number 6, the
Appellant's conviction should be reversed and the matter
remanded for new trial.

-9-
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